Volume 34

Issue 3

Article 2

April 1928

The Legal Effect of Pre-Incorporation Stock Subscriptions
Clarence Morris
University of Wyoming

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Clarence Morris, The Legal Effect of Pre-Incorporation Stock Subscriptions, 34 W. Va. L. Rev. (1928).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol34/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research Repository @
WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The Research
Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Morris: The Legal Effect of Pre-Incorporation Stock Subscriptions

WEST VIRGINIA
LAW QUARTERLY
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NUMBER 3

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF PRE-INCORPORATION
STOCK SUBSCRIPTIONS
CLARENCE MORRIS*

Corporations, unlike Topsy, do not just grow; they must
be organized. And organization at its simplest is highly
complex human behavior extending over a period of time.
A group must be gotten together (ostensibly at least) and
certain juridical cabala, must be perfoimed before the state
sanctions "the ownership of property and the transaction
of business by individuals in the corporate mode."' Organization behavior is not complex merely because the requirements of the general incorporation laws make it so. The
initiation of a new business by an individual is, in itself,
sufficiently involved under present complex industrial conditions. But when the corporate project is launched there
are added such problems as: "Getting together" the group
of prospective business men and property owners; determining the burdens and benefits of group members; securing state sanction, etc. Ordinarily all goes well, negotiations and promises are followed by cooperation; and the
desired end of a legally formed corporation is achievedeach member of the pre-incorporation group becomes a
stockholder without the aid of courts of law. But sometimes
business plans go astray, and some of the prospective stockholders refuse to take part in the corporation after its for*
1

Professor of Law, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo.
I owe this phraseology to Professor Hohfeld. See 9 COL. L. REV. 285, 288.
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mation, or the corporation refuses to receive some of them
into membership. It is proposed here to discuss the legal
effect of signing a subscription paper before incorporation
when such pathological cases are presented to the courts.
Space and time will not permit the consideration of any
but the simple questions thus presented, and it is the intention of the writer to limit himself to "the American Common Law" of the subject; without consideration of any of
the cases except those in which the simple business corporation has been formed under a general incorporation statute.
There is no general duty to pay stock subscriptions, such
as the duty not to commit assaults and batteries, the duty
not to maintain a nuisance, etc. In other words, a stranger
to pre-incorporation proceedings and the subsequently
formed corporation has no duty to pay money or property
into the corporate fund. The duty, if it exists at all, is
in personam (or paucital, if you wish) and is based on associational relations. The duty to pay a stock subscription,
when such exists, is a subscriber's duty; the stock subscription transaction consists of that sort of behavior which we
usually designate as "consensual."
Ordinarily the jural
relations arising from consensual behavior are easily dealt
with under the law of contracts. But will the present problem fit into the scheme of contract law? The apparent
major difficulty is that the corporation is not a juridical person at the time pre-incorporation subscriptions are made.
But let us examine the following possibilities:
(1) The corporation is a stranger to pre-incorporation
subscriptions, and has no jural relations based on it; and
hence, if the subscription list is a contract at all, it is between the subscribers who alone have rights, duties, etc.,
under it.
(2) The pre-incorporation subscription is a continuing
offer which the corporation may, or does, accept at, or after, the time of incorporation, at which time the contract
relation between the subscriber and the corporation is complete.
(3) The pre-incorporation subscription list is a contract
for the benefit of a third party beneficiary-the corporation.
And as a last possibility:
(4) The legal effect of a pre-incorporation subscription
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does not fit the usual scheme of Contract Law, and must be
determined on other, or possibly unique, principles.
(1) The Corporation as an Utter Stranger to PreIncorporationSubscriptions.-Earlycases in Ohio, 2 Vermont,3
Pennsylvania, 4 and a case in New York as late as 19055 all
treat a corporation as though it were an utter stranger to
pre-incorporation subscriptions. In these cases the subscriptions were made in contemplation of the incorporation which took place afterwards, and the corporations
were attempting to enforce the pre-incorp oration subscriptions by suit, but the courts allowed no recovery.
Such treatment would have much to be said for it if the
objects of the law were symmetry, and ease of application
of legal rules-and nothing more. However, if such treatment were generally adoptd it might work many hardships
on business. Its general application would force those who
wished to terminate negotiations leading toward corporate
organization to first incorporate and then deal with the
subscribers. In all probability, it often happens that those
who conceive a corporate scheme are not ready to determine its details to the extent required by the incorporation
statutes" before consulting co-ventures. Yet, in our fast
moving business world, where idle funds mean loss, and
speed and sureness of business transaction are constantly
demanded of our legal system, it is highly desirable that
the usual business bargains be quickly made and legally
protected. If a scheme must cool once the bargaining point
is reached, and be re-entered before the arrangement is
binding, the deal is apt to go awry, injuring those who have
relied on its consummation. Further, such treatment would
put the burden of incorporating on the inceptors of the
scheme, while the incorporation would be an advantage to
all stockholders.7
An apparent answer to these objections is that treating a
corporation as a stranger to pre-incorporation subscriptions
does not necessarily have the effect of allowing the sub2Dayton

Co. v. Adam Coy, 13 0. St. 84 (1861).
a Wallingford Mfg. Co. v. Fox, 12 Vt. 304 (1840).
Straburg Co. v. Echternact, 21 Pa. 220, 60 Am. Dee. 48 (1853).
a Avon Springs Co. v. Weed, 189 N. Y. 557, 82 N. E. 1123 (1907); reversing 119
App. Div. 560, 134 N. Y. S. 68 (1907).
0 Such as determining the total capitization, the scope of the corporate enterprise,
etc.
All this rationalization is offered with an implied apology for arm chair observation.
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scribers to disregard the terms of a bargain that they have
entered into-that subscribers can protect themselves by
a contract between themselves as is done in the underwriting cases. And to be consistent, if bargaining subscribers had sued defaulting co-subscribers in the cases mentioned above, a recovery in damages should be allowed.
But what is the measure of damages? This question,
coupled with the often insignificant financial interest of a
single subscriber, practically prohibits suits of that kind.
The writer has found no case (short of an underwriting
agreement) in which individual subscribers were successful
in a suit against a defaulting co-subscriber for damages for
failure to take and pay for stock. And it is interesting to
note that in such a suit in Montana 8 a recovery was denied. 9
Further, in some states, even though there were no business difficulties which would prevent those who wished to
organize a company from incorporating first and seeking
Subscribers afterwards, that possibility is blotted out by
Statutes that require subscriptions to capital stock as a condition precedent to incorporation.'0
Suffice it to say, as will be developed later in this paper,
-with proper citations, the corporation of today is not considered as an utter stranger to pre-incorporation subscriptions, and while the decisions of the early cases cited may
be justifiable in some way, their dicta of lack of privity between corporations and pre-incorporation subscribers have
been practically set to naught."
Before proceeding, it might be well to point out that in
many cases all the difficulties that confound the question
-of pre-incorporation subscriptions are often unnecessarily
dragged into the opinions of cases which might be well decided on other grounds;-the class of cases in which the
stockholder-corporation relation exists because of the conduct of the subscriber and the corporation after organizaI Deschamps v. Loiselle, 50 Mont. 565, 148 Pac. 844 (1916). See also soemblo, Athol
Music Co. v. Carey, 116 Mass. 471 (1884).
9 In Twin Creek v. Lancaster, 79 Ky. 552 (1881) a corporation was allowed a recovery on a pre-incorporation subscription even though the subscription list was worded:
"We promise and agree to subscribe." Cf. Mt. Sterling Co. v. Little, 77 Ky. 429 (1888).
in which a corporation was not allowed to recover on a subscription list worded: "The
undersigned proposed to subscribe."
1oMACHEN, MODERN LAW OF CORPORATION, 148 §163.
' In Athol Music Hall Co. v. Carey, supra, n. 8, an instruction was asked by a
defendant pre-incorporation subscriber to the effect that he could not be held by the
corporation without ratifying his subscription after incorporation. The court held that
1uch instruction was rightly refused, And see McClure v. R. R., 90 Pa. 269 (1879).
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tion. In these cases the relation would exist even though
there had been no pre-incorporation subscription. For example, it was early settled that one who accepts shares
issued to him is under a duty to pay for those shares. 12 But
the supreme court of Nebraska 1 3 in an action to recover the
unpaid residue on shares of stock has spent much time discussing the effect of the pre-incorporation subscription;
even though the organized company had issued a certifi-

cate to the subscriber entitling him to his shares, which he
accepted and for which he had issued a receipt. The court
fails to mention the possibility -f a duty to pay for the
shares based on the stockholder-corporation relation,

though with this rationalization it could have reached the
desired result.
14
The New York court in Avon Springs Company v. Kellogg,
was forced into this short cut. In that case a company was
seeking to recover on a check issued in payment for shares
of a company. There had been a pre-incorporation subscription, but this had been held to be insufficient to ground
a recovery of the subscription price in another action against
another subscriber. 5 After giving the check in payment

for scrip which the company issued to him, and which he
accepted, the subscriber stopped payment. The court gave
judgment for the company with its eye only on what happened after incorporation.

Sintilarly, it has been held repeatedly that when an installment on shares has been paid by the subscriber and
accepted by the corporation the company may collect the
balance by suit.' 6
22In re Empire Co., L. R. 6 Ch. App. 266 (1870).
,3 Nebraska Co. v. Lednicky, 79 Neb. 587, 113 N. W. 246 (1907) ; see also Intermountain Publishing Co. v. Jack, 5 Mont. 568, 6 Pac. 20 (1885); Ferro-Chem. Co. v.
Danziger, 23 Cal. App. 584, 138 Pac. 966 (1914).
", 194 N. Y. 687, 88 N. E. 1132; affirming 125 App. Div. 51, 109 N. Y. S. 163 (1908).
1 Avon Springs Co. v. Weea, eupra, n. 5.
1* California Hotel Co. v. Callender, 94 Cal. 120. 29 Pac. 859 (1892) ; Ferro-Chem.
Co. v. Danziger, supra, n. 13; Griswold v. Board of Trustees, 26 Ill. 41, 79 Am. Dec.
361 (1861) ; Stone v. Great Western Oil Co., 41 Ill. 85 (1866) ; McCormick v. Great
Bend Co., 48 Kan. 614. 29 Pac. 1147 (1892) ; Business Men's Assn. v. Williams, 137 Mo.
App. 575, 119 S. W. 439 (1909) ; McFarland v. West Side Assn., 53 Nebr. 417, 73 N. W.
736 (1896); Buffalo Co. v. Gifford, 87 N. Y. 294 (1882); McCord V. Southwestern Co.,
168 S. W. 226 (Tex. 1913). See also Horseshoe Co. v. Sibley, 157 Cal. 442, 108 Pae.
808 (1910) ; Warren Assn. v. Boyd, 171 N. C. 184, 88 S. E. 183 (1916) ; Cartwright v.
Dickson, 88 Tenn. 476, 17 Am. St. Rep. 910 (1890). It is not submitted that in all of
these cases the only possible operative fact is the stockholder-corporation relation based
on the payment of an installment. In some there are perhaps other facts which might
be sufficient to justify a recovery for the corporation. In other words, some of these
citations only stand for the point for which they are cited in the alternative. It is
interesting to note that diligent search has failed to disclose one case in which there
has been payment of an installment in which the corporation has not been allowed to
recover the residue.
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Lack of space, and knowledge on the part of the writer,
do not permit a thorough summary of the types of evidentiary facts from which the operative fact of the stockholdercorporation relation follows. However, it is unfortunate
that the courts have not articulately used this rationalization; the lack of such practice has confused the problem of
the legal effect of pre-incorporation subscriptions to a surprising degree. It is hazarded that the explanations for
this neglect are: The obvious comparison to the general
assunipsit actions presents the bugaboo of finding either the
passage of "title" resulting in'unjust enrichment, or the conference of a benefit on request. Added to these difficulties
are the damage tests in the general assumpsit actions of
unjust enrichment or reasonable value, neither of which will
fit the case, (the only possible measure of damages being the
par value of the stock, or that portion of the par value which
remains unpaid.) The answer to these objections is that the
jural incidents of the stockholder-corporation relation are sui
generis and not dependent on the usual limitations of the general assumpsit actions, and are so treated when there has
been no pre-incorporation subscription. 17 The practical difficulty presented for judicial determination is what type of
behavior on the part of the prospective stockholder and his
prospective associates results in his quasi-joint ownership
of property and engagement in business with them in the
corporate mode so as to found an action to compel payment for his participation."" The question is more hard than
unsolvable and has been handled by our courts when other
9
opinion fodder is considered unavailable.1
(2) Pre-IncorporationSubscriptions as Continuing Offers
to Contract.-Text writers and courts have insistently announced and re-iterated that a pre-incorporation subscription
is a continuing offer, made by the subscriber to the afterward
organized corporation, which may ripen into a contract on acceptance by the corporation. Since all contracts-other
than those implied in law-are either lilateral or unilateral
(not by any inherent magic but because jurists have found
it convenient to make this inclusive classification) our purIT In re Empire Co., supra, n. 12.
1s See Balfour v. Gas Co., 27 Ore. 800, 41 Pac. 164 (1895).
39 This approach was considered as a negative test In Dayton Co. v. Coy. 18 0. St.
84 (1861) ; and see Rensselaer Co. v. Barton, 16N. Y. 457n. (1854).
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pose will be better subserved to consider the problem at
hand under these separate heads.
I. Bilateral.
(A) Express Acceptane.-In the cases of Shiffer v. Akenbrook 20 and Redwing Company v. Friedrieh,21 the respective
defendants had subscribed to stock in proposed companies.
The companies were thereafter organized, and at meetings
of the boards of directors the subscriptions were accepted
by resolution. In those two cases it was held that the nowincorporated companies might maintain suits against the
pre-incorporation subscribers and recover the amounts of
their subscriptions.
However, the writer has been unable to find a case in
which it was held that the failure of the board of directors
to accept pre-incorporation subscriptions formally or expressly was an operative fact fatal to an action by the corporation to recover the sum subscribed. It will appear later
that there are many cases in which there are no formal or
express acceptances of pre-incorporation subscriptions, and
in which the corporations have been successful in actions
to enforce the subscriptions. We may conclude, then, that
if the pre-incorporation subscription is an offer, there need
be no express promise on the part of the corporation in
acceptance. If a promise need be found on the part of the
company it may be found in corporate behavior that is not
verbalized.
(B) Implied Acceptance.-To modify a homely expression:
"Actions may speak as loudly as words." Hence, by unverbalized conduct one may so act that his behavior is factually
equivalent to a verbalized promise. 22 So the mere fact that cor
porations are successful in suits to enforce subscriptions made
prior to incorporation without making a verbal promise is not
sufficient to condemn the bilateral contract theory. Unfortunately the courts have never given us a verbal equivalent of the
promise that the corporation must make in order that a
contract be formed. But let us attempt to do what the
courts have left undone; let us suppose that the preincorporation subscription is an offer looking to the formation of a bilateral contract. What, then, is the promise
, 76 Ind. App. 149, 130 N. E. 241 (1921).
21 26 Minn. 112, 1 N. W. 827 (1879).
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, §90.
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sought from the corporation as the bargain equivalent of
the subscriber's promise to become a stockholder? It can
be but one thing: "In return for your promise, Mr. Subscriber, to assume the burdens of a stockholder, we, the
corporation promise to enter the stockholder-corporation
relation with you."
It is conceivable that a mere call on the part -of the company may be interpreted as indicating in fact the promise
which we have supposed to be the necessary promise
of the corporation. And since the layman usually demands
what he thinks to be his rights before he goes to courts
and lawyers, it is practically impossible to find a case in
which a corporation is attempting to hold a pre-incorporation subscriber, who has not repudiated, where there is no
evidence -from which just such a promise could not be
implied.
However, consider the case of Clapp v. Gilt Edge Consolidated Mines Company.2
In that case the plaintiff made a
subscription before incorporation. The other subscribers repudiated the plaintiff's subscription before incorporation.
The company had no dealing with the plaintiff which was
brought out in evidence. There is not even any evidence
that the company made a call. Yet the company was held
bound by the subscription. From this case, it is at least
certain that acts on the part of the corporation which would
indicate some sort of a promise are not always necessary to
bind the corporation to pre-incorporation subscription arrangements. But merely because there may be special circumstances in which the pre-incorporation subscription is
binding without finding a bilateral contract does not completely explain the .bilateral contract theory away. The
duty in the Clapp Case may arise from the unique circumstances not present in other cases.
But what is to happen to any theory which regards the
subscription as an offer for a bilateral contract in view of
the many cases in which corporations seek and recover the
entire subscription? The measure of damages in actions on
bilateral contracts when the plaintiff has not performed is
Loss of Bargain. Hence, we should find that if a corporation has not passed title to shares of its stock the measure of
2v 33 S. D. 123, 144 N.

W. 721 (1913).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol34/iss3/2

8

Morris: The Legal Effect of Pre-Incorporation Stock Subscriptions
EFFECT OF PRE-INCORPORATION SUBSCRIPTIONS

227

damages should be the difference between the market price
-of those shares and the contract price 24 But corporations
seldom5 seek loss of bargain, nor is this the test that courts
apply.

2

Thus in Schrober's Administrators v. Lancaster Associathe organized company sought to hold the preincorporation subscriber for the entire amount of his subscription. The subscriber did nothing more than sign his
name to a subscription list compiled before incorporation.
He did not attend any meetings, nor did he have any dealing with the company at all. The company went ahead
with its affairs, spent considerable money, and made calls
on the subscriber for the full amount which he ignored.
A judgment was entered for the company for the full
amount of the subscription, and though the judgment was
objected to as error, it was affirmed.
In order to fit the Schrober case into the theory of bilateral contracts we rhust first imply that the pre-incorporation
subscription was an offer looking to a promise on the part
of the company as acceptance; that making calls on the
part of the company is sufficient to justify an implication
of this acceptance-promise; that making calls is also an
execution of the contract on the corporation's part. The
artificiality of the situation is at once apparent. To justify
a bilateral contract theory the following distortions must
be performed:
(a) An offer must be implied from a pre-incorporation
signature to a subscription list. This signature is no offer
to anyone, except possibly those negotiating for a division
of prospective business and prospective business property
which is to be conducted and owned in a novel way-the
tion,26

corporate way. 2T

This offer must be implied to be to a

juridical person, made by a layman who has no conception
of juridical persons.
(b) An acceptance must be implied from a demand of
the now formed juridical person that the implied promise
24 In Bullock v. Falmouth, 85 Ky. 184, 3 S. W. 129 (1887),
the court limited the
recovery to loss of bargain. See also Johnson v. Plank Road Co., 16 Ind. 389 (1861).
:5 McCord v. Southwestern Co.,
upsa, n. 16.
: 68 Pa. 429 (1871).
In Edinboro v. Robinson, 37 Pa. 21D, 78 Am. Dec. 421 (1860), the subscription
list did not mention that the subscribers intended to incorporate. Yet a corporation was
allowed to recover o proof that it was organized to effect the transactions contemplated in the subscription list. Can it possibly be said that this defendant subscriber
was offering to the corporation?
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of the implied offer be performed.
(c) From demandatory conduct it must be assumed that
the contract is performed: viz., that the stockholdercorporation relation is brought into existence.
After making all these beautiful assumptions that have
no'factual basis we can fit he Schrober Case into the rule
of damages which is ordinarily applied to express bilateral
contracts when the plaintiff has performed. Such hocuspocus may result in symmetry that pleases the academic,
but what place has it in the moving social science-Law?
It will be noted that application of the theory of bilateral
contracts to a case in which the corporation is seeking to
recover the entire subscription requires a finding that the
contract is executed; and therefore, in order to justify a
holding for the plaintiff corporation, it must be found that
the stockholder-corporation relation is established. If that
fact is found in a particular case, an implication of offer
and acceptance is mere surplus baggage, since (as developed in IV) the stockholder-corporation relation is an operative fact in itself justifying a holding that the subscriber is
under a duty to pay the par value of his stock.
II. UnilateralContract.-At first glance the treatment of a
pre-incorporation subscription as an offer looking for acts
from the corporation as an acceptance seems to do away with
much distortion. The shaky ground of having to imply an allbut-verbalized promise on the part of the corporation is
dodged. Furthermore, the damage question is somewhat
relieved, in as much as a unilateral contract must be fully
executed by the acceptor before he may successfully seek
the aid of courts of law to secure the bargain equivalent
offered; and, when the acceptor has performed, he is entitled to the entire bargain equivalent.
But still such a theory presents a major distortion: the
implication that a pre-incorporation subscription is an offer is usually unwarranted in as much as laymen preincorporation subscribers are not attempting to bargain with
a juridical person, to come into juridical existence at some
time in the future, and, if they bargain at all, they usually
bargain with each other.
(C) Critique of any continuing offer theory. The main
objection that has been submitted to the continuing offer
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theory is that it is overburdened with distortion, but criticism does not stop there. The super-defect of such a
theory is that it does not fit the decided cases.
For example, Tonica v. McNeey, 28 holds that a corporation
can recover on a pre-incorporation subscription even
though the subscriber dies before incorporation. How is it
possible to reconcile this decision with the rule of contracts
29
that death revokes an offer?
In Steely v. Texas Company 0 a corporation was allowed to
recover the full amount of a pre-incorporation subscription
even though there had been no corporate action before repudiation. In order to fit this case into any theory of continuing offer it would be necessary to proceed in the legalistic process of implying promises from acts not promissory;
and add that it is further implied that subscribers had promised not to revoke their already implied promises. No court
has attempted this distortion.3 1
In Sanders v. Barnaby32 the action was by the assignee of
the corporation who sought to recover on pre-incorporation
subscriptions. The complaint contained no allegation that
the company had accepted the subscription. Yet the court
held that there were sufficient facts stated to constitute a
3
cause of action. And in Nehama Company v. Settle1
the
court refused to enforce a pre-incorporation subscription
against a subscriber, even though the subscription remained
unrevoked, and the incorporated company had tendered
the stock to the subscriber.3 4
So the often announced continuing offer theory is not
only a distorted legalism; it also fails to account for the be2 21 IMI.71 (1859). Cf. Wallace v. Townsend, 430 0. St. 537, N. E. 601 (1885).
29 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, 862. But see Professor OHphant's article in 18 MICH. L.
REy. 201, 209. Compare Professor James Lewis Parks, 19 MICH. L. REV. 152, 160. See
also 24 COL. L. REv. 294.
20 55 Tex. Civ. App. 463, 119 S. W. 319 (1909).
" See also Muncy Co. v. Green, 143 Pa. St. 269, 13 At. 747 (1888)
following instruction to the jury was given with the approval of the upper court: "If the defendant
withdrew * * * * before they (the incorporators) were ready to file their papers in
the Secretary of Commonwealth's office, then the plaintiff cannot recover. If afterwards, they can recover." And see Auburn Wks. v. Schultz, 143 Pa. St. 256, 22 AtL.
903 (1891). Also in De Giverville v. Thompson, 190 Mo. App. 682, 176 S. W. 409 (1915);
Haskell v. Sells, 14 Mo. App. 91 (1893) : Johnson v. Plank Road Co., supra, n. 24, corporations were allowed to recover even though there was evidence tending to prove
that there was repuidiation before incorporation. In Lake Ontario R. R. v. Mason, 16
X. Y. 451 (1857), the court went so far as to refuse evidence that there had been a
revocation before Incorporation.
2 166 App. Div. 274, 151 N. Y. S. 580 (1915).
3 54 Kan. 380, 88 Pac. 483 (1894).
8' In Francis Hotel Co. v. Chicco, 131 S. C. 344, 127 S. E. 486 (1925); there was
no incorporation until tio years after the subscription. The corporation was allowed
to recover on this subscription. Can this he reconciled with the rule that an offer must
be accepted within a reasonable timeT
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havior of courts and should be cast off as worthless, even
though it cannot be replaced by other sound rationalization.
No rationalization is better than misleading theory. The
lack of rationalization would be at least stimulus to lawyers and courts presented with the problem and would lead
to a more accurate and real solution.
(3) The Pre-IncorporationSubscriptions as Constituting
a Contract for the Benefit of a Third Party.-The courts
sometimes have vaguely treated pre-incorporation subscriptions as though they were contracts for the benefit of the corporation to be formed, as a third party
beneficiary. 5 This theory at first sight would seem to do
away with many difficulties: no acceptance by the corporation would be necessary; the cases in which there was repudiation before incorporation, which was held to be ineffective, would be accounted for.
But here again, we have a theory that will not fit all the
cases. It has been held that, in certain circumstances, a
repudiation on the part of the pre-incorporation subscriber
will relieve him though neither the corporation nor other
subscribers assent."( Thus a third party beneficiary theory
breaks down, for a party to a contract cannot relieve himself
by his own repudiation even though it be for the benefit of a
third party.
A further difficulty is that, even in jurisdictions where
some classes -f third party beneficiaries are recognized as
having remedial rights, the types of beneficiaries recognized
are usually limited to creditor beneficiaries and donee beneficiaries. The corporation will not fit into either of these
classifications. It is not a creditor of the subscribers except
by virtue of their potential membership in the corporation,
and they are not bargaining for payment of debts existing
or to come into existence. Nor do the subscribers purport
to make the corporation a gift.
Laymen organizing a corporation are seldom dealing for
85 West v. Crawford, 80 Cal. 19, 21 Pac. 1123 (1889),
the third party In this case
was a "natural person" who was to collect subscriptions as a quasi-trustee for the
corporation to be fornied. Compare Horseshoe Co. v. Sibley, eupra, n. 16. Seo CLAnK,
GORPORATIONS (3d ed.) 336.
" Vermillion Sugar Co. v. Vallee, 134 La. 661. 64 So. 670, Am. Cas. 1916A 695
(1914) ; Bryants Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt, 87 Me. 234, 82 At]. 888 (1895); Muncy
Co. v. Green, eupra, n. 31; Hudson Co. v. Towers, 161 Mass. 10, 36 N. E. 680 (1898) ;
Collins W. Morgan Grain Co., 16 F. (2d) 253 (1926) ; Coleman Hotel Co. v. Crawford,
290 S. W. 810 (Tex. 1927) ; Tavern Co. v. Burkhart. 87 Mich. 182, 49 N. W. 662
(1891). And see Boushall v. Myatt, 167 N. C. 828, 88 S. E. 52 (1914).
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the benefit of a third party, a juridical third party of whose
imminent existence they are unaware. They are dealing
for themselves. They are attempting to get together and
divide the burdens and benefits of a prospective business.
Further, it has been held 7 that a corporation itself may
be bound by pre-incorporation subscriptions, and may be
forced to issue, stock or pay its money equivalent. It has
never been believed that third party beneficiaries are
bound to accept the bounty of a contract made for their
benefit.
(4) A Rationale of Pre-IncorporationSubscriptions.-It
is not submitted that there could be no cases in which
the continuing offer theory, or the contract for the benefit
of a third party theory, could be applied. If subscribers
clearly indicate that their subscriptions are meant to arouse
a reasonable expectation in a corporation to be formed, that
their subscriptions are made to induce an acceptance on the
part of the corporation, there is no objection to treating the
subscriptions as offers; and applying the same rules of contract resorted to when an offer is made to an existing company to take its shares.38 Or again, if the corporators clearly
go through all the necessary conduct to constitute a contract between themselves for the benefit of a third partythe corporation-there is no good reason why the rules governing such contracts should not be applied. But unfortunately for those, who would have the law an artistic system of ideology, laymen are very inconsiderate of legal
rules turned academic, and usually -fail to designate, either
by word or act, which of the two alternative juristic schemes
they favor. Inasmuch as law should be made to fit justifiable business conduct rather than business conduct being
made to fit the law, it would perhaps be well to speculate
on just what these business men are doing.
Suppose this simple case: A, B, and C decide to form a
corporation to go into the grocery business. All negotiation
between them is complete; they have settled the details of
the business to the most minute degree; they have decided
how much each shall put into the concern; they have laid
complete plans for the organization and conduct of their

37Wallace

v. Eclipse Coal Co., 83 W. Va. 321, 98 S. E. 293 (1919) ; Clapp v. Gilt

Edge lMines Co., 33 S. D. 123, 144 N. W. 721 (1913).
See Vermillion Co. v. Vallee,

supra, n. 36.
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entire business. When they have reached this point each
wants some assurance that the scheme is binding, and with
that end in view each signs his name to a subscription list.
The list sets out all the details in full; but says nothing about
continuing offers or third party beneficiaries. Let us suppose further that each of them on signing writes after his
name: "I intend this subscription to be binding."
Certainly, when these subscribers sign, all the elements
usually found in a business bargain which is enforceable by
virtue of the laws of Contracts are present. All the reasons
for enforcing the expectations of contracting parties in general, apply to enforcing the expectations of these three that
each will do his part in organizing and conducting the business.39 It would be entirely consistent to allow the other
subscribers to maintain individual actions against one who
defaults after this bargain is entered into, as is done on
breach of a partnership agreement. However, in such actions the courts would be embarrassed in attempting to
find a measure of damages. (Courts are willing to face
this embarrassment brazenly in actions for breach of partnership agreements, but only because there is no other satisfactory way out.) It is hard for non-defaulting subscribers, if not impossible, to prove that they cannot procure
some one else to take the defaulter's place. What their
services are worth in seeking such a third party cannot
often be evaluated; -forusually they are not in the business
of finding people to enter schemes. Further, the value of
the performance of the defaulter is dependent largely on
the success of the venture of the three; and the venture of
the three has become only a speculative possibility because
of the default itself. No wonder courts have shied when
such subscribers have attempted individual actions. 40 Effective justice can be better done another way. By forcing
the defaulter to take the interest in the business that he bargained to take and pay for, the bargain is fully protected
and he is not imposed on. No supervisory functions need
be exercised by the court to see that its decree is performed.
The defaulter is not forced to remain in personal contact
with the other corporators, in that the corporate mode of
2,See

(1897).

Elizabeth Mills v. Dunstan, 121 N. C. 12, 27 S. E. 1001, 61 Am. St. Rep. 0r4

Deschamps v. Loiselle. supra, n. 8.
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doing business can be a vicarious one. Further, if the other
corporators are obnoxious to him he may sell his stock and
retire from the arrangement entirely. The rules governing the conduct of corporate business are designed to protect adequately even a minority stockholder to whom other
stockholders are hostile. In order to accomplish this result
it is convenient and perhaps necessary to allow the corporation to sue. 41 Call it specific performance if you will, call
it enforcing a contract made by the acceptance of a continuing offer, call it a contract made for the benefit of a third
party; as long as the issue is not confused it makes no difference what legalisms are used to reach this desired result.42
But past experience has proved that distorted legal theory
43
leads to distorted results.
This proposition is not complete without corollaries. In
our hypothetical case we assumed that the signers of the
subscription list were ready to bargain and in fact did bargain when they signed. But the act of signing a subscription list need not be done in a bargaining situation. Thus in
Tavern Company v. Burkhart44 the defendants signed a preincorporation subscription list on the understanding that the
paper was not binding, but merely an initial negotiatory proceeding "to see what could be done." The defendants withdrew before the negotiatory stage was terminated in bargain.
The afterwards-incorporated company was not allowed to recover on the subscription. 45 In Allen v. Hastings Indu~trial
Company6 the subscription list provided that subscriptions
0 See 'est v. Crawford, supra, n. 35, in which the court says: "The subsequent
incorporation .of the company named in the contract is of no consequence except that
it fixes the time when money should become due and payable * * * * *"
4 Wallace v. Eclipse Coal Co., supra, n. 37; Clapp v. Gilt Edge Mines Co., eupra,
n. 87; Chicago Co. v. Peterson, 133 Ky. 596, 118 S. W. 384 (1909).
0 It is not submitted that once bargain between the subscribers is found that the
corporation can sue under any circumstances. In allowing the corporation to sue,
rights of bargaining subscribers are settled. Working in an opposite direction from
those cases in which the court "goes behind the corporation," the corporation is "put
In front of" the non-defaulting subscribers to enforce their rights. Hence, if the subscription list is a conditional bargain, the usual rules of conditions are applicable.
Thus, In Auburn Wks. v. Schultz, supra, n. 31, if there was a bargain between the subsecribers at all, it was conditioned on the erection of a factory and the conduct of the
corporate business in a specified place. Establishment of the factory in another place
relieved the subscriber. Further, in cases in which it is not proved that the corporation
Is the corporation that was contemplated there can be no such recovery. In other
words, the corporation cannot be "put in front of" others than the non-defaulting subecribers and maintain the action. See California Sugar Co. V. Schafer, 57 Cal. 896
(1881) ; Snook v: Georgia Imp. Assn., 83 Ga. 61, 9 S. E. 1104 (1889) : Wheeler v.
Floral Mill Co., 9 Nev. 264 (1874) ; Woods Co. v. Brady, 181 N. Y. 145, 78 N. E. 674
(1905).
4 87 Mich. 182, 49 N. W. 662 (1891).
4"See also Feitel v. Dreyfoos, 117 Ia. 756, 42 So. 259 (1906) : Da Ponte v. Breton,
121 La. 454, 46 So. 671 (1908).
0 2 Ga. App. 291, 58 S. E. 604 (1907). See also Patty v. Hillsboro Mill, 4 Tex. Civ.
App. 224, 28 S. W. 836 (1893).
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were not binding until $6,900 was subscribed. The defendant
pre-incorporation subscriber withdrew before that sum was
subscribed. He was held not liable in a suit by the company.
Similarly in Nehama Company v. Settle47 it was held that a
pre-incorporation subscriber was not bound, since he was the
only subscriber, and hence there was no bargain with anyone.
Even Wallace v. Townsend which held that a subscriber who
died before incorporation 48 and Tonica Company v. McNeely
which reaches the opposite result4 9 can probably be reconciled
on the basis that death occurred in the former case before
bargain, but did not occur in the latter case until after bargain. 0
If there were an absolute and easily definable distinction
between negotiation and bargain in all cases, the foregoing
rationale would seem to meet the problems of pre-incorporation subscriptions. Unfortunately, those engaged in organizing a corporate enterprise are not always sure themselves whether they are bargaining or negotiating. Further,
what is legally inoperative negotiation at one time may become part of a bargain by subsequent behavior of the parties, or even by the behavior of some of the parties. In the
cases just considered in the last two sections of this paper,
the problem was easily settled by the facts of the cases
themselves. In those cases in which the fact of bargain was
clearly established by the evidence, the pre-incorporation
subscription was held to be binding, and vice versa. But
what to do when this very fact is in dispute? The ordinary
solution would be to turn the facts over to a jury or a court
and allow the chosen weigher of fact to reach one conclusion or the other, subject to the usual rules of evidence. But
another alternative presents itself; viz., the establishment of
rules of thumb which will cover most of the cases justly.
To h certain extent this later solution seems to have been
adopted.
For example, it seems to be a universal rule that a preincorporation subscriber cannot be held unless all the stock
" 54 Kan. 424, 88 Pac. 483 (1894).

43Supra, n. 28.
9 Supra, n. 28.
60 Other cases standing for the proposition that a pre-incorporation subscriber who
did not enter a completed bargain cannot he held are: Campbell v. Raven, 176 Mich.
208, 142 N. W. 355 (1913) ; Vermillion Co. v. Vallee, supra, n. 86; Collins v. MIorgan
Grain Co., 16 P. (2d) 253 (1926), and see Woods Co. v. Grady, supra, n. 43.
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of the prospective company has been subscribed 5 ' with
these exceptions: (a) When the subscription list itself, or
the subscribers, express a different intention.5 2 (b) When
the statute under which incorporation is contemplated expressly permits organization and commencement of business without all the capital stock subscribed for.5 3 Should
there be bargain between pre-incorporation subscribers before the entire capital is subscribed (which is unlikely) and
should the situation be one in which neither of the exceptions to the rule are operative (which is more unlikely) it is
submitted that the bargain, though worthy of legal protection, would not give rise to the usual bargain jural relations.
But as rules of thumb go, this one is little likely to work
hardship.
How far this rule of thumb method can be extended for
dealing with the cases in which the alternative factual conclusion of either bargain or negotiation is difficult, if not
impossible, to reach, is a matter for judicial experiment by
the trial and error method. Early courts have treated the
mere signature of the subscription paper as though it we!re
sufficient evidence of bargain. 4 But thid did not produce
che desired results and has fallen by the wayside. There
seems to be a tendency to hold a subscriber who does not
withdraw before incorporation papers are ready to file
with the state officials, and to release him if he does repudiate before that time.5 5
It is to be noted that the danger of this rule of thumb
method is that it will be applied to cases in which bargain,
or lack of it, can be established by the evidence. Such an
extention of this method would give a legalistic rather
than a workable result.
It is not submitted that this rationale will cover all the
cases. The dictum of the continuing offer theory has been
repeated too often in some jurisdictions, and the courts
have taken it to heart. Hence it has sometimes been held
1 Branch v. Augusta Glass Wks., 95 Ga. 673, 23 S. E. 128 (18951 ; Enterprise Wks.
V. Schendel, 55 Mont. 42, 173 Pae. 1059 (1916); Flury v. Irwin Cities Dairy Co., 136
Wash. 462. 240 Pac. 900 (1925) ; Galveston Hotel Co. v. Bolton, 46 Tex. 633 (1877).
-3 Auburn Assn. v. Hill, 3 Cal. 839, 32 Pac. 587 (1893); see also Balfour v. Gas
Co., supra, n. 18; Business Men's Assn. v. Williams, supra, n. 16; but see Livesay V.
Omaha Hotel Co., 5 Nebr. 50 (1876).
a Utah Hotel Co. v. Madsen, 43 Utah 285, 134 Pac. 577 (1913) ; Rensselaer Co. v.
Barton. supra, n. 13.
51 Lake Ontario R. R. v. Mason, supra, n. 81.
'5Muncy
Co. v. Green, supra, n. 31. See also Auburn Wks. v. Schultz, supra,
n. 31; Steely v. Texas Co., 55 Tex. Civ. App. 463, 119 S. W. 319 (1909).
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that a pre-incorporation subscriber may withdraw at any
time before incorporation, the court not addressing itself
to the question cf whether or not the bargaining point has
been reached. 6 However, it is submitted that hard cases
will eventually alter this situation as they did in Wallace v.
Eclipse Coal Company and in Clapp v. Gilt Edge Mining
57
Company, and in Chicago Company v. Petergon.
Conclusions
(1) When pre-incorporation subscribers reach the bargaining point, the pre-incorporation subscription should be
legally binding on both the subscriber and the afterward
incorporated company.
(2) When the point of bargaining is not reached by preincorporation subscribers, the subscription should be of no
legal effect.
(3) When it is difficult, or impossible, to reach a conclusion on the question of whether bargain is reached rules of
thumb are sometimes applied to determine this fact. No
complete system of rules -of thumb has yet been devised.
" Bryant's Pond Steam Mill Co. v. Felt, supra, n. 86; Coleman Hotel Co. v. Crawford, supra, n. 86.
07 Supra, n. 42.
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